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ABSTRACT 
 
Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1993; 1996) suggested that the belief that small firms are major 
contributors of new jobs is largely based on methodological flaws. In particular, their 
reasoning about the ”regression fallacy”, i.e., that temporary fluctuations in size 
systematically biases estimates in favour of small firm job creation, has caught on interest 
among researchers and concern among policy makers. In this article we attempt to estimate 
the extent of overestimation of small firm job creation due to the ”regression fallacy”. It is 
concluded that the effect is very small and that correcting for it does not lead to qualitative 
change of the results. There may be good reasons to question to what extent small firms can 
lead economic development, but concern for the ”regression fallacy” does not seem to be an 
important issue in this context. 
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Introduction 
 
Since David Birch’s (1979) original findings were presented, studies in many countries have 
come to the same conclusion: small and newly founded firms create most jobs or at least their 
share of job creation is much larger than their share of the employment base (Baldwin & 
Picot, 1995; Davidsson, Lindmark & Olofsson, 1995a; 1996; Fumagelli & Mussati, 1993; 
Kirchhoff & Phillips, 1988; Spilling, 1995; see also Aiginger & Tichy, 1991; ENSR, 1994; 
Loveman & Sengenberger, 1991; OECD, 1987; Storey, 1994; and Storey & Johnson, 1987, 
for further reference to studies carried out in a large number of countries).  
 
The general conclusion that small firms are of great importance for job creation has, however, 
not been unchallenged. The best known critics probably are Harrison (1994a; 1994b) and 
Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1993; 1996; see also Haltiwanger, 1995).  A valid point of 
criticism these authors share is that the mere finding that small firms are over-represented as 
job creators, if true, does not justify the conclusion that therefore small firms should be 
supported. But that is a point of little controversy among researchers with an interest in the 
issue (cf. Davidsson. Lindmark & Olofsson, 1995b; ENSR, 1995; Schreyer, 1996; Storey, 
1994).  
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The critics go on, however, to suggest that  the finding simply is not true. In a working paper 
which attained widespread readership, Davis et al (1993) used theoretical examples and 
empirical analysis of the American manufacturing industry 1973-88 to show that the 
conclusion that small firms create most jobs is based on three methodological flaws:  
 
1) the size distribution fallacy (making dynamic inferences from static comparisons),  
2) confusion of gross and net job creation, and  
3) the ”regression fallacy” (that temporary fluctuations across the size limit biases results in 
favour of small firms).  
 
Of these three methodological problems the first two are easily dismissed because a) few 
studies are subject to them and/or b) the resulting bias could run in any direction, and thus not 
systematically bias the results in favour of small firms (cf. Davidsson, 1994; 1995). We thus 
agree with the following quotations: 
 
It is unquestionably these results [concerning the ”regression fallacy”] which have attracted 
attention to the D. H. S. paper (Storey, 1995, p. 5) 
 
This criticism [the ”regression fallacy”] by Davis et al. has the most force. However, its 
quantitative significance needs to be evaluated. (ENSR, 1995, p. 120) 
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Purpose 
 
Several authors have discussed in some depth the Davis et al criticism. (Baldwin & Picot, 
1995; Davidsson, 1994; 1995; ENSR, 1995; Gallagher & Robson, 1995; Kirchhoff, & 
Greene, 1995; OECD; 1994; 1996; Storey, 1995). In short, the counter-arguments are that a) 
using plant data from the manufacturing sector is not appropriate for making any relevant 
statements about the role of small firms  in the economy at large, b) applying Davis’ et al 
alternative methodologies for defining firm and plant size classes does not alter the basic 
conclusion that small firms are over-represented as job creators, and c) however, applying 
their suggested methodology is likely to lead to a much more distorted image of what is going 
on in the economy than does using the methodology that most researchers have hitherto 
favoured. 
 
While some of the above-mentioned authors have also provided data analyses that  cast doubt 
on Davis’ et al conclusions, they have not tested directly the extent of  ”regression bias”. 
Doing that is important, because Davis et al recently published essentially the same 
manuscript as a book chapter and also made their data set available to other researchers in a 
form that forces users to apply the methodological ”corrections” that Davis et al favour 
(Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh, 1996). The whole logic behind the creation of that data set is 
that a) using the methodology Davis et al try to prevent others from using leads to a distorted 
image of real changes in the economy because of the ”regression fallacy”, whereas b) 
applying the methodology Davis et al prefer does not lead to such distortions because it 
corrects for the ”regression fallacy” without introducing other distortions. 
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The purpose of this paper is therefore to evaluate the quantitative significance of the 
”regression fallacy”. We will do so for the Swedish economy during a six year period (1989-
94),  using 200 employees as the size boundary between ”small” and ”large” firms. The data 
set is unique in that it covers all sectors of the economy (not just manufacturing), that it 
permits annual analysis on the firm level (not only plant level), and that it keeps track of all 
units that in an individual year crosses the size boundary (as a result of expansion, 
contraction, acquisition/merger, or spin-off/buy-out) as well as the job stock and job changes 
attributable to these units. Before turning to that, however, we will review Davis’ et al (1993; 
1996) argument and empirical results. 
 
The regression fallacy according to Davis et al 
 
In Table 1 Davis et al  (cf. 1993: Box 4; 1996: Box 4.3) illustrate how boundary crossing may 
bias the conclusions as regards job contributions by small and large firms.  
 
============================ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE! 
============================ 
 
Using 500 as the size limit for small firms, this example shows that while the total number of 
employees in small firms remains the same (column 4) and the situation in year three is 
identical to year 1 (rows 1 and 3), it is still possible to erroneously arrive at the conclusion 
that small firms perform better than large firms as job creators. This is so because when a firm 
experiences positive development and therefore crosses the size boundary, all of the increase 
is ascribed to its base-year category (i.e., small firms). When the same firm in the next year 
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shrinks back its base-year category has changed, and therefore all of the job losses are 
ascribed to large firms. In the example, growth rates are compared. However, the problem 
applies to shares as well, as long as all of the change is ascribed to the base-year category. 
When comparing years 1 and 2, 100% of gross job gains are created by a small firm (Firm 1) 
and 100% of gross job losses are ascribed to a large firm (Firm 2). When comparing years 2 
and 3, these two firms have changed categories, and although they both merely swing back to 
their original sizes, 100% of the job gains is again ascribed to the small firm sector. 
 
The problem is general and there is no counterbalancing effect. When using base-year size 
without correcting for boundary-crossing, it will always be the case that the analysis 
systematically biases the result in favour of small firms, relative to a size classification that 
keeps each firm’s size affiliation constant over time or one that ascribes every unit job change 
to the size category the firm belongs to at the time the change occurs. Hence, Davis et al 
(1993; 1996) point at a real problem, which they refer to as the ”regression fallacy” or 
”regression-to-the-mean-bias”.  
 
This fallacy is a pitfall well-known to (but not always avoided by) researchers with a 
reasonably thorough statistical training. The essence is that when repeated measures are made 
for members of extreme categories on a scale, measurement error or random fluctuations over 
time can only cause changes in one direction. The question is: is boundary-crossing so 
frequent that it seriously distorts the results in empirical studies of small firm job creation? 
 
Davis et al obviously think it is. They therefore suggest that this problem be solved by using 
other ways to attribute firms to size classes. Instead of base-year size, i.e., the size (No. of 
employees) at the beginning of the analysis year, they prefer average size, computed as the 
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unit’s average employment across all periods the unit exists in the data base. In some cases 
this means the average for the entire 1973 to 1988 period.  As a ”second best” option, they 
calculate current size, defined as the average of size at time t and size at time t+1 (i.e., the 
size before and after the twelve-month period for which job changes are analysed). 
 
In their empirical analyses Davis et al (1993: Table 2; 1996: Table 4.2) compare the results 
for the three size-class categorisations, using nine plant size classes from 0-19 employees up 
to 5000+. The most dramatic differences by far occur for the smallest size class, 0-19 
employees. With base-year measure of plant size, this size class has an estimated gross job 
creation rate of 25.7 percent; a gross job destruction rate of 15.4 percent; and (consequently) a 
net job creation rate of 10.3 percent. Positive net job creation occurs only for this and 
(marginally) for the second smallest size class. With the current plant size measure the 
corresponding rates are 18.7 percent, 23.3 percent, and -4.5 percent, respectively. With this 
size class criterion the smallest size class performs worst of all size classes in terms of net job 
creation, followed by the 20-49 employees size group. The differences in results for average 
size versus base-year size are in the same direction but not quite as dramatic. Davis et al 
attribute them solely to the ”regression fallacy”:  
 
Evidently, the regression fallacy illustrated in box 4.1 operates with powerful effect in the 
LRD data for the US manufacturing sector. (1996, p. 70; cf. 1993, p. 17) 
 
What are the problems with Davis’ et al analysis? 
 
Another way to portray the regression problem is exemplified in Figure 1. Note, however, that 
this example, like the one given by Davis et al, gives a distorted view of reality in that all of 
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the firms cross the size boundary at some time. In reality, the large majority of firms would 
crawl their way through time at the very bottom of the figure, far from ever getting close to 
the size boundary. This would be true even if the first size boundary were set at 20 
employees, as in Davis’ et al empirical analyses.  
 
Consider Firm 1 and Firm 2 in this chart. With the size-measure normally used, i.e., base-year 
size, all of their growth from 1989 to 1990 will be ascribed to ”small firms” although some (in 
one case most) of that growth occurs after they have crossed the size boundary. In the next 
year, 1990, both firms are, according to the base-year size criterion, large firms. Therefore, all 
of their decline is ascribed to the large firm sector. This undoubtedly is unsatisfactory. 
 
=========================== 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE! 
=========================== 
 
With Davis’ et al (1993; 1996) average size measure, the firms’ sizes would be computed as 
the average size over the entire 1989-96 period. With the current size measure, their sizes 
with regard to attributing 1989-90 employment changes would be computed as (size 
1989+size 1990)/2. With both of these size measures, Firm 1 would always be a large firm, 
and its expansions and contractions would be attributed to the same category of firm. Same is 
true for Firm 2, which is now always a small firm. So far, this undoubtedly seems to be an 
improvement. 
 
So what are the problems? There are several. Firstly, base-year size, current size, and average 
size are alternative definitions of firm size. Under the base-year size definition it is a fact with 
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regard to Firm 1 and Firm 2 that during the 1989-96 period, small firms created 100 percent 
of all gross new jobs, and that large firms were responsible for 100 percent of all gross job 
losses. So there is, under that definition, no bias involved, only a potential for misleading 
interpretations. This potential arises because the analysis does not answer the important 
question why small firms are over-represented as job creators. In a real-world analysis the 
main explanatory variable may turn out to be ”size-as-such”, but it may also be ”recent 
decline” (which is the Davis et al hypothesis) or some other variable, e.g., firm age.   
 
Secondly, both the average size and the current size criteria include the employment change 
to be analysed in the size classification itself. As pointed out by Havnes (1996), any analysis 
of firm size and job creation implies a causal relationship, where the cause must precede the 
ensuing effect. The size measures Davis et al propose therefore break the elementary 
principle of getting the time order between independent and dependent variables right in 
causal analysis.  
   
Thirdly, and most importantly, it is not the regression-to-the-mean effect that causes Davis’ et 
al results to alter completely when they switch from base-year to current size. The size 
criteria Davis’ et al prefer to base-year size are far from flawless themselves. While reducing 
or eliminating one possible ”bias”, they introduce new ones. The fact is that an averaging size 
class criterion is definitely preferable only if all size changes are random fluctuations (cf. 
Baldwin & Picot, 1995, pp. 321-322; Kirchhoff & Greene, 1995; OECD, 1996, pp. 22-24). If 
they were, we would not have much interest in these phenomena. When applied to firms that 
show other (and more likely) development trajectories like Firm 3 or the ill-fated Firm 4, the 
size class criteria proposed by Davis et al cause all kinds of problems. 
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The precise effects of exchanging base-year size (i.e., employment at the beginning of a 
twelve month analysis period) for average size (i.e., average over all time periods) are 
intractable without access to the raw data, but it is clear that its use is based on the rather 
peculiar view that firms and plants have an ”intended scale of operation” (Davis et al, 1993, 
p. 29; 1996, p. 80) around which they fluctuate. It is rather remarkable that they maintain this 
view in the light of  empirical evidence that there is no tendency among plants for long term 
convergence to an optimal size (Konings, 1995) and especially when they have themselves in 
an earlier chapter established as a key fact that  
 
Most of the job creation and destruction that we observe over twelve-month intervals reflects 
highly persistent plant-level employment changes. (Davis et al, 1996:17) 
 
It is also clear that with the average size classification, the event that a firm of size 50 hires its 
51st employee could be assigned to any size class depending on the size development history 
of that firm in years prior to and after that event. This assignment is also contingent on the 
number of years the data set happens to cover. For example, if the data set covers the entire 
1989-96 period, Firm 3’s expansion in the 1989-90 period would be attributed to large firms. 
If, however, 1994 were the end year, that same expansion would be attributed to the small 
firm category.  
 
The effects of using Davis’ et al ”second best” alternative, current size (i.e., the average of 
size at t and t+1; using twelve-month analysis periods), are more precisely tractable. 
Exchanging base-year size for current size removes regression problems of the kind 
illustrated in Table 1 and firms 1 and 2 in Figure 1 (”random fluctuations”) and therefore 
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seems reasonable. However, when base-year employment is exchanged for ”current” 
employment the following also happens: 
 
• All jobs created via large expansions are excluded from the smallest size class. That is, 
when units expand from 15 to 25 employees, or from 10 to 30, or from 2 to 40, no job 
creation is recorded for the 0-19 (base-year) employees size class. 
  
• All jobs lost via contractions are ascribed to the smallest size class as long as the average 
is less than 19 employees. That is, when units contract from 23 to 15 employees, from 28 to 
10, or from 36 to 2, all job losses are recorded for the 0-19 size class. 
  
• Unlike intermediate size classes, no part of job growth in other size classes (according to 
the base-year size criterion) will ”spill over” to the 0-19 size class, and no part of job losses in 
that (base-year) size class will ”spill over” to other size classes. 
  
• Possibly, all jobs lost via dissolution of units which have base-year employment between 
20 and 38 employees are ascribed to the 0-19 employees size class. This happens if closed 
units are recorded as having zero employees in their terminal year; whether such is the case 
cannot be determined with the information Davis et al provide. 
 
The fact that it is not mainly the ”regression-to-the-mean” effect that causes Davis’ et al 
results to alter is effectively shown by an analysis conducted by Baldwin & Picot (1995). 
They employ all three size measures discussed by Davis et al (1993) plus several others in 
their analysis of the Canadian manufacturing sector, and back up the analysis with thoughtful 
theoretical reasoning and interpretation. One size class criterion they try is previous period 
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average size, defined as the average size for the two years preceding the analysis period (i.e., 
Davis’ et al current size measure with a one-year time-lag). To make the correction, it makes 
no difference if the averaging is done as  (st0+st1)/2 or as (st-1+st0)/2; these firms would be 
classified in the same manner either way. However, averaging over previous years solves the 
time order problem while still solving also random fluctuation problems of the kind 
exemplified by firms 1 and 2 in Figure 1. 
 
The results are strong evidence against Davis’ et al assumption that it is temporary 
fluctuations that make the smallest units come out favourably when the base-year size 
definition is used. When Baldwin & Picot (1995) go from base-year size to current size, their 
results alter in a similar fashion as did Davis’ et al, although the effect is not quite as dramatic 
as in the American data. However, when they apply the previous period average size the 
opposite happens. Instead of reducing the job creation rate for the smallest size classes, 
shifting from base-year to previous period average size further increases that rate for the two 
smallest size classes. The reason for this is that it is trend growth, not temporary fluctuations, 
that makes up the lion’s share of boundary-crossing job creation (cf. Baldwin & Picot, 1995, 
pp 320-321).     
 
Baldwin & Picot’s analysis clearly shows that there is more than correcting for random 
fluctuations involved when base-year size is exchanged for other size class measures. Their 
analysis does not, however, provide much of an estimate of the extent of bias in studies 
employing solely the base-year size criterion, compared with an ideal, error-free size measure. 
Given the attention Davis’ et al (1993; 1996) concern about the regression fallacy has 
received it would therefore be useful to have more direct evidence on the size of the 
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”regression bias” from real world data. In the following sections we will present such 
evidence for the Swedish economy. 
 
Data for the Swedish study 
 
We would argue that a study that aims at estimating the role of small firms in job creation 
should a) allow for analysis of the entire economy or the entire private sector, and b) allow for 
analysis on the firm level rather than the plant level (because the firm rather than the plant is 
the relevant unit for most policy measures and theoretical accounts. In order to estimate the 
extent and practical significance of ”regression-to-the-mean-bias” the data set should also 
   
• separate entry and exit from expansion and contraction among established firms (because 
”random fluctuations” and hence the ”regression bias” applies to ongoing business, and the 
results are blurred if mixed with entry and exit which may be different for different size 
classes) 
• employ but two or a few size classes rather than many size classes (because the regression 
problems increase with the number of size classes and because the theoretical and policy-
making discussions concern small-large or, at the most, micro-small-medium-large) 
• allow for assigning every employment change to the size class the unit belonged to at the 
time that event occurred. Therefore, job changes in units that cross a size boundary during an 
analysis period should be split between the size categories involved (whereas the job base 
which consequently is transferred should not be included in the estimates of job gains or 
losses for any size class) 
 
 14
For our on-going study of business dynamics in the Swedish economy in the 1990’s (cf. 
Davidsson, Lindmark & Olofsson, 1996) we have compiled a data set which fulfils these 
criteria. The study is a follow-up, which also involves methodological refinement, of our 
previous study of the late 1980’s (cf. Davidsson et al, 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1995a; 1995b; 
1995c). The data set was developed in close co-operation with experts at Statistics Sweden. 
 
Importantly, the data set covers different business cycle conditions. The first year in the data 
set, 1989, was the last year of the boom period of the 1980’s. In 1990, the economy slowed 
down markedly. The 1991-93 period marks the deepest recession the country has experienced 
since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In 1994 a dramatic upturn occurred, although 
unemployment levels remain high.  
 
The data set was compiled from four different registers at Statistics Sweden. It tracks births, 
dissolution, expansions and contractions among all active business establishments (approx. 
600 000) and their annual job changes. The basic element thus is the business establishment 
(and its associated number of jobs). The establishments are further identifiable in terms of 
 
• industry (17 categories) 
• employment size class for establishments (six categories, largest is >200 empl.) 
• location (83 regions) 
• type (independent single-site, branch, headquarters) 
• employment size of the larger structure (firm, company group) of which the establishment 
may form part (smaller or larger than 200 employees) 
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On the basis of this data set, we made in a previous report (Davidsson et al, 1996) estimates 
for small firms’ share of employment and employment change in the private business sector 
(excluding primary industries and the public sector). We found that during the 1990-93 
economic downturn period, small firms accounted for 50.1 percent of the employment stock 
on average. At the same time, small firms accounted for 67.4 percent of gross job gains but 
only 58.4 percent of gross job losses. On a more detailed level, small firms accounted for 74.6 
percent of job creation via births, 75.4 percent of job losses via dissolution, 64.1 percent of 
expansion job creation, and 51.8 percent of contraction job losses. As it was a period of deep 
recession, both small firms and large firms had negative net job creation. However, small 
firms’ share of net losses was 29.2 percent, i.e., considerably less than the sector’s share of  
the employment base. The results further showed that small firms were over-represented as 
job creators in virtually all kinds of industries. During the economic upswing in 1994, small 
firms were even more over-represented as job creators in gross and net terms. They were also 
found to be strongly over-represented as job creators during the 1986-89 boom period 
(Davidsson et al, 1993; 1994a; 1995a). 
 
In the data set, job changes are ascribed to the category the establishment belonged to at the 
beginning of the analysis year. i.e., the base-year principle was employed. This creates 
potential for a regression problem, and the above reported results are thus of the kind Davis et 
al (1993; 1996) suspect may be attributable to the regression bias. The problematic cases are 
the following: 
 
1. A small firm establishment (SFE) expands and contributes to the event that the firm or 
company group it belongs to is a large firm (has >200 employees) by the end of the year.  
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2. A SFE expands during an analysis year and is during that same year acquired by a large 
firm (or a firm which becomes a large firm because of the acquisition). 
3. A SFE contracts and is acquired by a large firm (or a firm which becomes a large firm 
because of the acquisition) during the analysis year. 
4. A large firm establishment (LFE) contracts and contributes to the event that by the end of 
the analysis year the firm or company group it belongs to is no longer a large firm. 
5. A LFE contracts and is spun off, bought out or acquired by a small firm (that remains a 
small firm also after the acquisition) during the analysis year, thus ending up a SFE.  
6. A LFE expands and is spun off, bought out or acquired by a small firm (that remains a 
small firm also after the acquisition and including the establishment’s expansion) during the 
analysis year, thus ending up a SFE. 
 
For gross job creation estimates, the events (1) and (2) may lead to overestimation of small 
firms’ contribution to the extent that the expansion occurs after the establishment has become 
a large firm establishment. Conversely, events of type (6) lead to underestimation of small 
firm gross job gains to the extent that the expansion occurs after the establishment has 
become a SFE.  
 
For net job creation estimates, also the events (3), (4) and (5) have to be corrected for. The 
latter two types lead to underestimation of small firm job losses if the contraction occurs after 
the establishment has become a SFE. Event (3) on the other hand may lead to overestimation 
of  small firm job losses, given that some part of the job losses takes place after the 
establishment becomes a LFE. 
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In the analyses to follow, we will estimate the effect of the regression bias. When interpreting 
these analyses, the reader should be aware of the following: 
 
• Unlike the results summarised above, the analyses concern the entire economy, including 
primary industries and the public sector. The reason for this is that data on boundary- crossing 
are available to us only at this aggregate level.  
• The basic unit of analysis is the establishment (plant). It is known for each establishment, 
however, whether the size of the firm or company group it belongs to has fewer or more than 
200 employees. This latter size classification is our operational definition of ”small firm” 
versus ”large firm”.  At the beginning of the period there existed 520 000 small firm 
establishments and 85 000 large firm establishments. Independent small firms accounted for 
just above 33 percent of the total employment base (NB! including the public sector). This 
share grew slightly during the period. 
• The analysis, before correction, concerns annual changes ascribed to the base-year 
category. Each analysis year is a new base-year. 
• As the ”regression bias” applies to on-going business, entry and exit with their associated 
job changes are not included in the analysis. All establishments that existed at the beginning 
and by the end of an individual analysis year are included. 
• When we correct for regression bias, it is  job changes during the analysis year that is 
transferred to another category. The transfer of job stock is not an issue in correcting for this 
type of bias.   
• We do not have data on the exact number of jobs that were gained or lost before and after 
the unit crossed the size boundary. We therefore first report the actual number of jobs gained 
and lost in boundary-crossing firms, and then correct the job change figures by assuming that 
half of the job change is attributable to the old category and the other half to the new 
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category. Note that this procedure corrects for all boundary-crossing, whether transitory or 
not. However, we will refer to it as ”correcting for regression bias.”  
• Some assumptions or simplifying conventions had to be applied, which however have 
marginal effects in the analysis: a) all single-site firms are counted as small firms, although 
some 50 of them (out of  480 000) do in fact have more than 200 employees; b) all foreign-
owned establishments (approx. 5 000) are regarded as large firm establishments; and c) 
establishments which contracted to zero employees in one analysis year, and disappeared 
from the register the next year, are regarded as closed in the contraction year already. This 
was on recommendations from experts at Statistics Sweden, because of known time-lags in 
deregistration procedures. Such contractions to zero  are therefore not included in the analyses 
below. This correction applies to approx. 3000 cases of dissolution annually (out of  some 60 
000). 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 displays data on expansion and contraction among establishments that were SFEs 
according to the base-year size classifications. The data on number of establishments reveal 
that each year between 63 and 87 thousand SFEs experienced employment growth, whereas 
another 65-77 thousand SFEs contracted. This represents roughly 15 percent each of the stock 
of SFEs. The last column shows that about one out of every hundred expanding SFE was in 
fact part of a large firm by the end of the year. However, a similar share of all contracting 
SFEs were also LFEs by the end of the year, either because they were acquired or because 
growth in other establishments within a multi-establishment small firm made it total more 
than 200 employees despite this particular establishment’s contraction. 
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=========================== 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE! 
=========================== 
 
The small firms that cross the size boundary are likely to be much larger than average small 
firms in the base year. They therefore also experience larger job changes than the average 
growing small firm does (roughly four times larger on average, according to the data in Table 
2). Therefore the share of SFE job changes that should in part be attributed to large firms is 
larger than the share of expanding establishments that cross the size boundary. As regards job 
gains, the table suggests that between 3.6 and 7.9 percent (5-12 thousand in absolute 
numbers) of SFE expansion job gains should in part be attributed to large firms instead. The 
figures for SFE contraction job losses that are in part attributable to large firms are somewhat 
smaller; 4-6 thousand, or 2.5 to 3.6 percent, of all SFE contraction job losses. In all, these 
data suggest there is a regression effect, but that it is small and that misclassifications in the 
opposite direction also occur. 
Part of the ”regression bias” is due to the fact that when a (base-year) large firm contracts, all 
of the job losses are ascribed to large firms although the losses that took place after the firm 
lost its 200th employee should, arguably, be recorded as a small firm loosing jobs. Therefore, 
the previous analysis has to be complemented with an analysis of boundary-crossing among 
(base-year) large firms. This analysis is displayed in Table 3.  
================================== 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
================================== 
 20
These data reveal that 20-27 thousand LFEs expand annually. This represents 25-35 percent 
of all LFEs. Another 30-40 percent (27-34 thousand) contract but stay in business. The 
proportion of changing establishments that cross the size boundary is larger for LFEs than for 
SFEs, which is to be expected considering the shape of any business population size 
distribution. About 1-3 percent of the expanding LFEs, and 1-4 percent of the contracting 
LFEs, end up as SFEs.  
 
Out of the contracting LFEs, between 400 and 1 200, representing job losses between 4 and 
13 thousand, become SFEs during the analysis year. This adds to a regression bias. The effect 
is reduced by the fact that some LFE expansion should be attributed to small firms (because 
the expansion takes place in spin-offs/buy-outs, or because contraction in other parts of the 
large firm more than offsets this establishment’s expansion so the whole firm becomes 
”small”, etc.). The figures here are somewhat smaller; 300-850 establishments representing 
some 3000 jobs on average.  
 
If we assume that dividing all changes in boundary-crossing units half and half between small 
and large firms represents a fair correction, the analyses in tables 2 and 3 suggest that some 
”regression bias” net effect does occur in base-year size analysis. In order to better clarify the 
extent of ”regression bias” in these data, Table 4 was compiled. In this table the annual 
changes have been aggregated over the six years. Recall that small firms’ share of the 
employment base was slightly above 33 percent. One piece of data in the table suggests that 
small firms’ share of total expansion job creation was much higher; 45.7 percent. Small firms’ 
share of gross job creation (excluding births) thus exceeds their share of the employment base 
by 12 percentage points. Except for the exclusion of births, this is the typical kind of result 
behind claims that small firms are over-represented as job generators in gross terms. 
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Including births typically strengthens that conclusion (as mentioned previously, if the analysis 
is restricted to the private sector and births are included, small firms account for 50 percent of 
the employment base and 67 percent of the gross job gains).  
 
=========================== 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE! 
=========================== 
 
Consider next small firms’ share of expansion job gains compared to their share of 
contraction job losses. The result is that small firms’ share of job gains exceeds their share of 
job losses by 9 percentage points (45.7 vs. 36.7 percent, both before correction). Except for 
the exclusion of births and deaths, this is the typical kind of result behind claims that small 
firms are over-represented as job creators in net terms. In our data,  the birth/death job 
creation ratio has been higher for small firms during upswings and higher for large firms 
during downturns; however, the qualitative conclusion for small and large firms’ shares of net 
job creation compared to their shares of the employment base remains unaffected by the 
inclusion or exclusion of these forms of business dynamics (cf. Davidsson et al, 1993; 1994a; 
1995a; 1996). 
 
So the data suggest that according to base-year size classification, small firms clearly 
outperform large firms in terms of gross and net job creation. Now, how much damage does 
correcting for the regression effect do to that conclusion?  As regards job creation, the 
corrections brings downs small firms’ share from 45.7 to 45.0 percent. This represent a very 
small share of small firms’ extent of over-representation as gross job creators, and it is very 
far from reversing the conclusion. The same is true for correcting the contraction side; small 
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firms’ share rises from 36.7 to 37.2 percent. After correcting for ”regression bias”, small 
firms’ share of gross job creation exceeds their share of the employment base by more than 11 
percentage points, and their share of job gains exceeds their share of job losses by almost 8 
percentage points. These results are certainly not alarming for those who have employed the 
base-year size in their analyses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In all, correcting for the ”regression bias” in these data amounted to correcting for fractions 
of percentages. Our conclusion would be that in analyses similar to ours (annual data; small 
number of size classes; large differences between large and small firms’ job creation relative 
to their employment bases) the regression fallacy highlighted by Davis et al (1993; 1996) 
leads to relatively insignificant distortions and has not led researchers to draw qualitatively 
false conclusions from such analyses. 
 
The counter-argument would be, of course, that our results concern one country--Sweden--
during a relatively ”atypical” period as regards economic development. However, although 
our data concern a period when considerable net job losses were experienced in the economy 
as a whole, both recession years and upswings were included and no major differences in the 
extent of ”regression bias” problems were revealed. Another counter-argument may be that 
our assumption that a fifty-fifty split of the job changes in boundary-crossing establishments 
between small and large firms distorts the results. On the basis of the size distribution of 
firms, it may be argued that a larger share of both job gains and job losses in boundary-
crossing firms should be attributed to small firms. However, adjusting that percentage has a 
very small effect on the results. 
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There are, however, situations where the extent of boundary-crossing may be greater than in 
our analysis, namely: 
 
• if more than two size classes are used 
• if, in a two-group analysis, the cut-off is set at a smaller size than 200 employees (this is 
the likely outcome because the smaller the size, the larger the number of firms, and therefore 
relatively more firms would cross the boundary. The 500 size limit used by Davis et al in 
their theoretical example would thus result in even less of a regression bias)  
• if the pool of medium-sized (i.e., close-to-boundary-sized) firms is relatively large 
• if the analysis periods are longer (possibly, but not necessarily) 
• if the general level of dynamism in the economy is higher (however, the size of transitory 
fluctuations or measurement error relative to ”true” changes may actually be the highest in a 
stable economy)  
 
Nonetheless, we would hold that there are fundamental reasons to believe that the ”regression 
fallacy” almost never would lead to heavily distorted results. These reasons are: 
 
1. Only a small fraction of  all job changes takes place in firms that are close to the arbitrary 
size boundary or size boundaries. 
2. Only part of total job changes represent ”temporary fluctuation”; there is also a trend 
component in firm size development (cf. Baldwin & Picot, 1995). Especially in young 
industries, where most net job growth takes place, trend growth of small firms is likely to 
overshadow temporary fluctuations many times over. 
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Davis’ et al (1993) working paper stimulated much debate on the job creation prowess of 
small firms. It forced other researchers to think more carefully about their methodology, to 
sharpen their argumentation, and to reconsider the link between empirical results based on 
spontaneous economic processes on the one hand, and policy implications on the other. In 
these regards, there contribution has been fruitful. However, we would hold that accumulating 
evidence suggests that they were essentially wrong in assuming that the finding that small 
firms are of great importance for job creation is based on methodological flaws, and in 
believing that their alternative size measures give a less distorted image of economic realities. 
It is therefore a disappointment to find that they three years later chose to publish their view 
in essentially the same form, and that they give other researchers no other choice than either 
using their ”ill thought-out” (Gallagher & Robson, 1995)  size classification criteria or 
refraining from using their data-base at all. It seems to be the case that employing base-year 
size yields results that are not heavily biased, and a basis for comparatively straightforward 
interpretations. To take care of the ”temporary fluctuations” problem, it is certainly an 
advantage if the analysis is supplemented with an analysis of the kind we have presented here. 
In relational analyses it would be advantageous to include ”recent decline” alongside with 
size as an explanatory variable with respect to job growth.   
 
While there is high-quality research to suggest that firm size and firm age have independent 
negative effects on firm growth rates (e.g., Evans, 1987) we would on the basis of our own 
research argue that it is their relative newness rather than their smallness as such that is the 
most important thing about small firms in the creation of jobs and wealth (Davidsson et al, 
1995b; Olofsson, Petersson & Wahlbin, 1986, p. 484) and hence that policies should focus on 
newness whatever the size category of firm. Davis’ et al (1996:76-81; cf. Haltiwanger, 1996) 
results actually point in the same direction. That, rather than concern for the ”regression 
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fallacy” should be carefully considered by firm believers in the ”small is (always) beautiful” 
ideology. 
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Table 1. Illustration of the regression fallacy 
 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Small 
Firms 
Big  
Firms 
All 
Firms 
 
Year 1  
employm. 
 
 450 
 
 550 
 
 600 
 
 450 
 
1150 
 
1600 
 
Year 2 
employm. 
 
 550 
 
 450 
 
 600 
 
 450 
 
1150 
 
1600 
 
Year 3  
employm. 
 
 450 
 
 550 
 
 600 
 
 450 
 
1150 
 
1600 
__________ 
Year 2  
growth rate 
__________ 
 .22 
__________
-.18 
__________
   0 
__________
 .22 
__________ 
-.09 
_________ 
   0 
 
Year 3 
growth rate 
 
-.18 
 
 .22 
 
   0 
 
 .22 
 
-.09 
 
   0 
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Table 2. Boundary crossing among (base-year) small firm establishments 
 
Expanding SFEs...  
year count
...out of which by the end of the 
analysis year were LFEs/LFE jobs
establishments 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
76752
80535
72237
64547
62909
87036
710
753
894
558
520
940
job gains in those 
establishments 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
169921
171939
158179
131351
132421
189056
7785
6198
12463
6674
5113
12178
Contracting SFEs...   ...out of which by the end of the 
analysis year were LFEs/LFE jobs
establishments 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
71563
77372
75766
73034
69811
65491
583
688
709
756
739
754
job losses in those 
establishments 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
155331
175498
162124
164823
140227
128087
5240
4451
4961
5901
4767
4494
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Table 3. Boundary crossing among (base-year) large firm establishments 
 
Expanding LFEs...  
year count
...out of which by the end of the 
analysis year were SFEs/SFE jobs
establishments 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
27456
27066
26760
21699
20092
23698
302
376
852
364
450
407
job gains in those 
establishments 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
209217
200382
193983
173385
151287
202079
2378
2073
5470
2277
2582
3065
Contracting LFEs...   ...out of which by the end of the 
analysis year were SFEs/SFE jobs
establishments 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
26983
28629
28145
33077
33864
28505
468
733
1162
760
450
422
job losses in those 
establishments 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
218248
259163
240129
350552
287468
242229
6144
10730
12841
8106
11205
4055
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Table 4. Summary of results for the 1989-94 period 
 
Job gains: 
 
Aggregate small firm gross expansion job gains according to  
base-year size calculations:        952 867 
 - 50% of all jobs created by small firm establishments that  
 were large firm establishments by the end of the analysis year             -  25 205 
 + 50% of all jobs created by large firm establishments that                 +    8 922 
 were small firm establishments by the end of the analysis year 
                            ======= 
Aggregate small firm gross expansion job gains corrected 
for regression bias:                              936 584 
 
Small firms’ share of total expansion job gains according to  
base-year calculation:                                 45.7%  
Small firms’ share of total expansion job gains corrected  
for regression bias:                                 45.0% 
 
Job losses: 
 
Aggregate small firm gross contraction job losses according to  
base-year size calculations:        926 090 
 + 50% of all jobs lost by large firm establishments that were 
 small firm establishments by the end of the analysis year                    +  26 540 
 - 50% of all jobs lost by small firm establishments that were 
 large firm establishments by the end of the analysis year                     -  14 907 
                            ======= 
Aggregate small firm gross contraction job losses  
corrected for regression bias:                              937 723 
 
Small firms’ share of total contraction job losses according to  
base-year calculation:                                36.7%   
Small firms’ share of total contraction job losses corrected  
for regression bias:                                 37.2% 
 
 
 
